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In Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to 
Western Thought, George Lakoff and I argued that converging evidence 
from cognitive science research garnered from several empirical 
disciplines supports a view of human meaning, conceptualization, and 
reasoning as grounded in aspects of sensory-motor experience and 
elaborated by various imaginative processes. Our central claim was that 
human thinking emerges from patterns of our ongoing engagement with 
environments that are at once physical, social, and cultural in character. 
For example, the fact that humans can stand erect and move about in a 
gravitational field in relation to various recurring contours of their 
physical environment has generated in human thought a certain primacy 
of structures of verticality, balance, and forward motion along a path. 
For example, to consider just verticality, while the notions of “up” and 
“down” (relative to a vertical orientation) have primary senses tied to 
our bodily experience, they can also be extended metaphorically in our 
understanding of abstract concepts, such as being up psychologically 
(as in “I’m really up today”), being in control (as in “she’s on top of 
things now”), increasing in quantity (as in “prices went up”), and 
gaining social status (as in “she’s way up there on the social ladder”).  
Chet Bowers embraces the motive behind our embodied cognition 
project, which is to challenge the notion of disembodied mind and 
thought, in favour of a view of mind as embodied, embedded in its 
environments, and engaged with the world. However, Bowers seems to 
think that, in spite of this central organism-environment interaction 
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theme of Philosophy in the Flesh, Lakoff and I somehow ended up with 
the same old reductivist, individualistic view of the self that takes no 
notice of its intimate relations with its environment. As far as I can tell, 
Bowers’ criticisms revolve around his perception that because Lakoff 
and I see meaning and thought as embodied, we necessarily overlook 
(1) the role of our environments in how we think and act, and (2) the 
massive cultural frameworks and modes of inquiry that are not 
explicable only in terms of individual human minds. On top of this, 
Bowers thinks that our alleged failure to understand cultural systems 
supposedly leads us to overlook the environmental crisis that is 
affecting everything we experience, think, and do. Among Bowers’ 
more specific objections are the following: 
1. He accuses Lakoff and me of having an individualistic theory of 
meaning and thought, one that either completely ignores, or else 
uncritically takes for granted, the cultural framework(s) we 
inhabit. He speaks of “the Western notion of the autonomous 
(that is, the supposedly culturally uninfluenced) individual they 
take for granted.”  
2. “This omission leads to their failure to acknowledge that today 
the ecological crises should frame any discussion of 
metaphorical thinking.” 
3. “Supposedly, the individual whose sensorimotor experiences 
and habituated neural connections become the basis for framing 
the meaning of words (metaphors), and thus for how 
relationships are understood, is unaffected by the global changes 
in the natural environment.” In other words, he accuses us of 
abstracting the “individual” from her setting and overlooking 
the monumental shaping force of environment and culture. 
4. Lastly, he claims that our “extreme reductionist understanding 
of the origins of knowledge leads to a radical difference 
between what individuals would learn from their embodied 
encounters with their local environments and what scientists are 
now reporting.” 
I am not sure that I can identify the appropriate connections between 
these four objections, but it seems to me that the first three criticisms 
are supposed to culminate in the fourth, which is that the individualistic, 
abstract conception of the human creature that Bowers attributes to us 
can have no room for the important scientific work on global climate 
change, and so is completely blind to the cultural frameworks shaping 
our sense of our world. 
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These four objections strike me as preposterous—the result of a 
dramatic misreading of Philosophy in the Flesh. Before now, I had not 
thought it possible for someone read that book as proposing a view of 
the human organism as individualistic, separated from its environments, 
and unshaped by cultural frameworks and artifacts. The reason I find 
this incredible is that every part of our account of the emergence of 
meaning, concepts, and inferential structures is predicated on the idea 
of the organism’s ongoing interaction with aspects of its environment. 
There can be no organism without its environment. My environment is 
implicated in everything I am, everything I experience, and everything I 
think, feel, and do. We are not brains in a vat. Nor are we merely brains 
locked up within bodies. Rather, the locus of human experience, 
understanding, and communication is an ongoing process of organism-
environment interaction that involves both perception and active 
transformation of that environment. You could not have image 
schemas, or conceptual metaphors, or radial categories, or any of the 
aspects of human thought that we presented in our book without 
transaction with a world—a world that is physical (material), social, 
and cultural. I summarized this view on page one of The Meaning of the 
Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding as follows:  
The best biology, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and 
phenomenology available today teach us that our human forms of 
experience, consciousness, thought, and communication would not exist 
without our brains, operating as an organic part of our functioning bodies, 
which, in turn, are actively engaged with the specific kinds of physical, 
social, and cultural environments that humans dwell in.  
What I’m saying is that our view of embodied thought is thus nearly the 
opposite of the one attributed to us by Bowers, in at least the following 
respects: 
1. What we colloquially call “the body” is never some 
autonomous, discrete lump of flesh that just happens to interact 
with some environment. The bodily organism exists only in and 
through its engagement with it environment. This is what Ulric 
Neisser has called the ecological self. 
2. Hence the structures of sensorimotor experience that are the 
bodily basis of meaning, concepts, and thought exist only as 
analog patterns of organism-environment transaction. These 
patterns are therefore not just in us (i.e., not just in our brains or 
our bodies); rather, they are in the world (or, in experience taken 
as at once both subjective and objective). 
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3. However, body-based concrete concepts (of, for example, 
objects, properties, spatial relations, affect, mood, bodily 
orientation, body-parts, object manipulation, and spatial 
locomotion) constitute only part of human meaning and thought. 
The other part involves abstract concepts (such as those for 
mind, knowledge, freedom, love, democracy, reason, and so 
forth). According to the embodied cognition view, abstract 
concepts require imaginative processes for mapping aspects of 
sensorimotor experience onto our understanding of non-spatial 
or non-bodily concepts. The name for these conceptual 
mappings is Conceptual Metaphor. Scores of empirical studies 
of these metaphor systems show that the source domains of the 
metaphors are typically aspects of sensorimotor experience. In 
other words, we “map” objects, operations, and relations of 
spatial and bodily domains onto non-physical domains, such as 
when we conceive of human thought via the Understanding Is 
Seeing metaphor (as in, “I see what you mean,” “That was an 
illuminating account of string theory,” “Could you shed more 
light on the causes of global climate change”). 
4. On the basis of such cross-domain mappings, the bodily or 
spatial logic of the source domain gets recruited for our 
reasoning about the target domain. In this way, conceptual 
metaphor is one of the chief devices for abstract thought. For 
example, just as vision requires an eye that sees, an object seen, 
and ambient light for seeing, so also, the Understanding Is 
Seeing metaphor requires some mental “eye” that “sees” (i.e., 
understands) some quasi idea-object, according to the “natural 
light of reason.” 
5. Consequently, Bowers is mistaken to attribute to Lakoff and me 
the thesis that “all thought is based on metaphors.” On the 
contrary, metaphor defines our abstract concepts, but not our 
concrete concepts. Our perceptual, spatial, orientational 
concepts are typically understood directly in terms of patterns 
and qualities of our bodily interaction with our environment, 
and then our abstract concepts are defined by conceptual 
metaphors and other imaginative structures that are typically 
grounded in aspects of sensorimotor experience. One of the 
great glories of human thought is our imaginative ability to 
recruit sensorimotor meaning and structure for understanding of 
and reasoning with abstract concepts. 
6. If follows from this that all of our systems of abstract concepts 
in our scientific, mathematical, and philosophical thinking 
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would involve vast systems of complex conceptual metaphors. 
Scientific understanding is inextricably tied to metaphorical 
frames, and it is the logic of the metaphors that determines how 
we think and reason. The technical term for this powerful effect 
on thinking is metaphorical framing. Activating a metaphorical 
frame, such as The Mind Is a Computer, or Nature Is an Organic 
Whole, prefigures how we circumscribe the phenomena of our 
inquiry and how we subsequently think about them. Therefore, 
completely contrary to what Bowers claims, it is precisely the 
embodied mind that makes scientific understanding possible, 
and so it is precisely the embodiment of thought that makes it 
possible for us to grasp the nature and significance of climate 
science. That is why I am baffled by his suggestion that, on our 
view, we could never explain the very climate science upon 
which our global ecological well-being rests. 
 
For the most part, the entire second half of Bowers’ essay is a mistaken 
attempt to claim that Lakoff and I do not grasp the power of metaphors 
to frame our understanding. He says, “The basic assumptions (listed 
below) of Lakoff and Johnson limit the individual’s conceptual 
understanding of the environment to the inherently limited nature of 
embodied experience. The result would be that grasping the world-wide 
consequences of global warming would be beyond the individual’s 
conceptualization.” But this is just wrong. It simply does not follow that 
body-based understanding is incapable of making sense of, among other 
things, climate science. For, if it can be shown that climate science (or 
any science, for that matter) is based on founding (framing) metaphors, 
then it is precisely a theory of how embodied cognition works that will 
illuminate our understanding of climate science and the factors that 
have contributed to our climate crisis. 
What I find even more frustrating is Bowers’ contention that our view 
of embodied mind, thought, and language cannot appreciate the framing 
power of metaphors. Here is how he states that objection: 
When they (Lackoff and Johnson) made the turn toward locating the 
source of metaphors in the embodied experience of the individual, which 
was motivated by their concern with the hegemony of abstract theory and 
language usage by mainstream Western philosophers, they lost sight of the 
more obvious and now ecologically important characteristic of language. 
That is, they ignored that words as metaphors have a history and that they 
carry forward the misconceptions and silences of earlier thinkers who 
succeeded in establishing the analogs that framed the meaning of words 
over time. In effect, they failed to recognize that the industrial-consumer 
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oriented culture that is now being globalized, and that is overshooting the 
sustaining capacity of the natural systems, is based on the metaphorical 
thinking of earlier thinkers who were unaware of environment limits. 
This passage is infuriating, because it completely ignores the nearly 
thirty years of empirical study and analysis by Lakoff, myself, scores of 
other linguists, philosophers, and psychologists of the key metaphorical 
frames that have defined entire scientific, theological, philosophical, 
economic, and political perspectives. If anyone is known for frame 
analysis, it is George Lakoff, who acknowledges his debt to the earlier 
work of his colleague Charles Fillmore on semantic frames. In several 
books, including Don’t Think of an Elephant, Whose Freedom?, and 
The Political Mind, Lakoff has done the most painstaking and detailed 
analyses of the conceptual frames that define virtually every aspect of 
our lives. Bowers speaks not of frames, but of “root metaphors,” an idea 
he borrows from the work of Richard Brown in the 1970s, but which 
actually was introduced by Stephen Pepper in his 1942 book World 
Hypotheses. Whatever name you choose, the basic insight is the same, 
namely, that complex, large-scale metaphorical frames shape virtually 
every aspect of how we will understand phenomena as circumscribed 
and defined within the domain conceptualized by the frame. 
How Bowers could claim that Conceptual Metaphor Theory, as tied to 
embodied cognition theory, cannot explain metaphorical frames and 
root metaphors is beyond my ken. The last nearly 500 pages of 
Philosophy in the Flesh, to cite just one example, are devoted to 
analyzing some of the key metaphorical systems that have defined our 
Western intellectual tradition. These last two of the three parts of the 
book involve to use of the tools of the cognitive science of the 
embodied mind to analyze, first, the key philosophical ideas (such as 
causation, time, mind, thought, the self, knowledge, morality), and, 
second, key philosophical traditions, such as those of the Presocratics, 
Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and parts of contemporary analytic 
philosophy of mind and language. Our chief purpose in doing these 
extensive analyses is precisely that which Bowers claims we do not, 
and cannot, do, namely, to show how our understanding of our most 
central philosophical ideas and some of our most influential 
philosophical traditions are vastly complex metaphorical frames. 
Furthermore, our claim, again and again, is that the failure to 
understand how these metaphors structure our thinking, and what 
different metaphors highlight and hide, is a fundamental failure of 
personal and cultural understanding.  
In short, Bowers’ insistence that our account of embodied knowing and 
metaphorical framing cannot allow us to examine the fundamental 
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assumptions of our scientific, theological, philosophical, moral, and 
political traditions (or any traditions, for that matter) is ludicrous. 
Several of his remarks in the last few pages of his article are just 
versions of this same misrepresentation of Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory, and they reveal a lack of familiarity with the rather extensive 
literature on how our cultural understanding is tied to our embodiment 
and organized according to metaphorical frames. To cite just one final 
example of this line of reasoning, Bowers thinks that the embodied 
cognition theory is somehow tied to the 
“embodied/sensorimotor/neurally connected experience of today’s 
individual,” and that we could never, on this basis, grasp key notions 
from earlier historical epochs or cultures substantially different from 
our own. I trust that the appropriate reply to this charge is fairly 
obvious. It is that, of course, we use the bodily resources for 
conceptualizing and thinking that we possess today (after all, what other 
basis could we possibly have?), and it is via those structures of bodily 
meaning and thought that we understand the conceptual systems, 
metaphorical frames, and value systems of historically distant and 
culturally different traditions. 
To conclude, one way to sum up the guiding theme of my entire reply 
would be just to say that Bowers has not understood the version of 
embodied mind, embodied meaning, and embodied language that 
Lakoff and I have been developing over the past three decades. The 
miss is not just a question of minor corrections; rather, it is a systematic 
misinterpretation of the whole orientation—its assumptions, key ideas, 
and forms of analysis and explanation.  
That said, it is true, as Bowers claims, that Lakoff and I do not give any 
account of global climate change in our book. I couldn’t agree with him 
more that climate change is one of the most pressing concerns for the 
future of life on earth. I admire his commitment to bringing our 
attention to some of the philosophical and scientific assumptions, often 
framed metaphorically, that have led and continue to affect the 
deterioration of our environments. However, I can see no reason why it 
should be thought to be a fault of a book on the bodily basis of 
meaning, concepts, thought, and language that it does not discuss global 
climate change. Instead, what a book of the sort Lakoff and I were 
trying to write ought to do is to give us the analytic tools (taken partly 
from the cognitive sciences) to make it possible for us to engage in any 
form of intellectual inquiry, from philosophy to religion to science. 
Climate science, including all of its mathematical components, will be 
one massive network of image schemas, body-based concepts, 
conceptual metaphors, metonymies, and conceptual blends. And so to 
really appreciate both the insights and possible limits of that climate 
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science, one must employ the tools of embodied cognition and 
metaphor analysis to the concepts and theories of that science. That, I 
submit, is one of the things that the cognitive science of the embodied 
mind contributes to our understanding of who we are, what our world is 
like, and how we ought to live. 
